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Abstract 
Major, preventable chemical incidents in the United States continue, many of which have caused 
injuries, fatalities, community harm, and damage to industrial infrastructure.  Since 1998, the U.S. 
Chemical Safety Board (CSB) has investigated more than 130 such incidents across the nation and 
has issued many recommendations that, once adopted, have led to safety improvements.  At the 
same time, CSB faces ongoing challenges concerning funding, staffing, and how to best address 
underlying organizational causes of incidents.   
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As a Member of the United States Chemical Safety Board (CSB), I talk with the families of 
loved ones who have lost their lives in horrific chemical disasters.  Families want to know what 
caused their loss.  And they often want to discuss how to prevent future tragedies. 
 
These conversations prompt reflection on the major national changes needed to achieve CSB’s 
vision of "a nation safe from chemical disasters”.   
 
Thus, my purpose today, is to address some central challenges for chemical safety -- and how 
CSB is addressing them.  
                                                          
1 References available upon request.  Find CSB investigation reports and recommendations at www.csb.gov. 
2 Disclaimer:  The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the U.S. government, or any agency thereof, including the U.S. Chemical Safety Board.  This document is a 







The concept of an independent federal agency to investigate the causes of major chemical 
incidents was prompted by horrific disasters, among them the 1989 Phillips incident in Pasadena, 
Texas in which 23 people died and more than 300 were injured. 
 
Congress created CSB in 1990 “…to investigate accidents and recommend measures to reduce 
the risk of catastrophic events.”  Presidents Bush and Clinton, however, opposed its funding, 
claiming that its role was duplicated by OSHA and EPA.  After efforts by labor unions, 
environmental organizations, some corporations, and eventually from industry trade associations, 
CSB was finally funded and began operating in 1998. 
 
CSB conducts investigations of chemical releases into the air from industrial facilities. The most 
comprehensive CSB investigations address multiple incident causes and circumstances, 
including physical factors such as equipment failure, as well as gaps in industry consensus 
standards, management systems, and government regulations.   
 
CSB is not a regulatory agency and does not issue violations, consent orders, or financial 
penalties.  CSB issues recommendations and their strength rests with our work’s scientific 
integrity and effective advocacy. 
 
During the CSB’s 21-years we have issued a total of about 100 reports, interim reports, bulletins, 
and case studies.  We’ve made 841 safety recommendations to facility management, trade 
associations, standard setting groups, unions, and regulatory agencies.  And we have produced 
many videos on specific incidents. 
 
Safety accomplishments catalyzed by CSB recommendations include: 
 
• After a fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate storage facility incident that killed 15 and 
injured 260, the Federal Emergency Management Agency created a training program on 
this hazard for emergency responders. 
 
• After an incident that injured 36 people, including six fire fighters, New York City 
revised its outdated fire prevention code for hazardous materials. 
 
• After an explosion that killed six workers at a natural gas facility, the National Fire 
Protection Association and the International Code Council developed codes to prohibit 
flammable gases for use in “gas blows” to clean piping. 
 
• After an oil refinery disaster that killed 15 contract workers and injured 180 others, many 
refineries removed temporary contractor trailers that were close to operating units. 
 
• After an explosion that killed four workers at a laboratory, the Accreditation Board for 
Engineering and Technology, Inc. (ABET) revised the chemical engineering curriculum 




was severely injured in a laboratory explosion, the American Chemical Society published 
guidance to prevent hazards in research labs. 
 
• After a refinery incident that led 15,000 residents to seek medical evaluation, CSB urged 
California to strengthen its PSM rule for its 14 refineries.  California then adopted the 
most comprehensive refinery safeguards in the nation, which can offer valuable lessons 
for reforming the federal PSM standard.   
 
CSB videos have been viewed more than 17 million times on YouTube, where we have over 
80,000 subscribers.   They are widely used in training in the U.S. and internationally.  Recent 
videos depict the impact of increasingly extreme weather on a chemical plant and the hazards of 
unregulated onshore oil and gas drilling. 
CSB faces major external challenges, among them that: 
 
1) There is no data base for recording chemical incidents.  Thus we cannot understand incident 
trends. 
2) Industry is under intense production pressures that can continue to undermine safety; and 
3) Necessary public safeguards are under assault. 
 
I’ll talk about each of these challenges – and what CSB can do to address them. 
 
CHEMICAL INCIDENTS CONTINUE WITHOUT KNOWLDEGE OF TRENDS 
 
The primary challenge for the CSB is that chemical incidents are frequent.  Many cause deaths, 
injuries, environmental impacts, and significant property damage.  We can investigate a small 
subset of these incidents given that CSB is a very small agency, with about just 40 staff 
positions.  Currently, we have 10 open investigations.   
 
Incidents occur at small, little known firms, such as at Midland Resource Recovery in Phillipi, 
WV, where three people were killed in 2017 in explosions involving reactive chemicals.  The 
founder and president of the company, which decommissions odorant equipment used in natural 
gas service, was a victim.  They also occur at huge multinational corporations, such as DuPont, 
Chevron, and ExxonMobil.  
 
At DuPont’s La Porte, TX facility in 2014, four workers died and three other workers were 
injured from their exposure to methyl mercaptan.  Two workers were killed when the chemical 
drained from open valves, filling a room with vapor. One of those workers made a distress call, 
and two more workers died while responding.  DuPont, a firm with a worldwide safety 
reputation, has had multiple process safety incidents.  This suggests that other major firms, not 
just supposed “outliers”, are vulnerable. 
 
While we definitively know that incidents continue, there is no contemporaneous, 
comprehensive, and publicly accessible database of major chemical incidents at industrial 
facilities.  The EPA’s Risk Management Program (RMP) data base, which includes about 12,000 





Unfortunately, this EPA data does not accurately show whether the number of these incidents are 
increasing, decreasing, or staying the same relative to the number of covered facilities. 
According to EPA’s 2018 Regulatory Impact Analysis, “Although the accident histories 
submitted with RMPs have shown a reduction in the frequency of accidents since the beginning 
of the program, there continue to be serious chemical releases. RMP data for 2004 through 2013 
show that each year there are an average of approximately 150 accidents with reportable 
impacts.”     
 
Yet EPA also maintains that there is now a “…low and declining accident rate at RMP 
facilities…”  EPA also notes, however, that “Past experience with RMP facility accident reports 
suggests that following the next 5-year reporting wave… the current 2014, 2015, and 2016 
accident totals will increase.”  
 
Moreover, EPA explains only the year and number of accidents occurring in that year (and some 
totals and averages).  Their analysis does not indicate a rate calculation – the number of 
accidents that occurred in a year divided by the number of facilities that could have had an 
accident during the year.  EPA uses only the static number of reporting facilities from the 2015 
RMP database without updating this number, which fails to account for manufacturing plant 
closings. 
 
> One opportunity for CSB is to issue an incident reporting rule, as directed by our enabling 
law.  On February 4, 2019, a U.S. District Court judge ordered CSB to issue, within one year, 
a regulation requiring facilities to report chemical incidents to CSB.  This regulation and the 
resulting data base can help everyone, over time, understand chemical incident trends. 
ONGOING PRODUCTION AND COMPETITIVE PRESSURES  
Corporate leaders truly want safe operations and zero incidents.  Most, however, face enormous 
bottom line production pressures.  Often, meeting obligations to stockholders is paramount. 
It’s common knowledge that corporate leaders control investment decisions.  They decide what 
products are made and where they are produced, the choice of technologies, production targets, 
preventive maintenance allocations, staffing levels, and workforce training. They choose their 
facility and enterprise levels of risk tolerance and allocate budgets for safety.  In a challenging 
economic environment, they make key decisions that determine safety outcomes.   
Executives themselves are concerned.  Three of every four executives felt operational risks in 
their companies were inadequately managed, according to a 2018 report by DuPont Sustainable 
Solutions.  Their report also found that “process safety” was one of the least discussed topics at 
Board meetings. 
> An opportunity for CSB stems from our in investigation of the 2010 Macondo well disaster 
in the Gulf of Mexico when the Deepwater Horizon rig blew out, leading to explosions and 
fires that killed 11 workers and massive marine and costal damage. A  CSB recommendation 




Interior called upon the agency to draw upon the best available global standards and practices 
and develop guidance addressing the roles and responsibilities of corporate board of directors 
and executives for effective major accident prevention.   
After BSEE rejected CSB’s recommendation, CSB committed to issuing this important and 
broadly applicable guidance.  This guidance could urge offshore oil and gas operators and 
contractors to adopt effective process safety systems, ensure board competency and training, 
enable reporting by employees of incidents, near misses, and “what could go wrong” to top 
executives, build strong worker participation programs,  assess executive compensation 
programs that incentivize production over safety, and address other critical matters. 
Hearing the views of corporations, unions, standard setting organizations and others with 
serious commitments to process safety will be important for issuing the best possible CSB 
guidance. 
THE SAFEGUARDS THAT PROTECT ALL OF US ARE UNDER ASSAULT 
 
Since their adoption, federal regulatory safeguards to prevent chemical incidents have not been 
fully modernized.  And even modest improvements are now threatened. 
 
After the 2013 West Fertilizer Company disaster, President Obama issued an Executive Order 
mandating federal agencies, including OSHA and EPA, to “…consider whether to pursue an 
independent, high-level assessment of the U.S. approach to chemical facility risk management to 
identify additional recommendations for all levels of government and industry to reduce the risk 
of catastrophic chemical incidents in the future”. This order, however, did not prompt serious 
debate about major reform. 
 
The Executive Order led to forward steps, most notably a revised EPA RMP rule that was issued 
in the last days of the Obama Administration.  Today, reforms to OSHA’s Process Safety 
Management (PSM) standard languish on OSHA’s regulatory agenda for “long term action”. 
 
Now the EPA is moving to dismantle even the modestly improved 2017 RMP rules.  They plan 
to issue a final rule, currently under review at the Office of Management and Budget that 
rescinds provisions on safer technology and alternatives analyses, third-party audits, incident 
investigations, and public access to information.  EPA’s own analysis admits that their rule will 
have a disproportionally negative impact on people of color and low income communities nearby 
industrial facilities.  
 
Unfortunately, dismantling these steps forward has received total support from industry trade 
associations. 
 
> As an independent agency, CSB’s opportunity is to continue our work based on a solid 
scientific and analytical footing -- and to urge effective government regulation when needed.  
CSB has called for a stronger, not weaker, RMP and PSM rules.  Our recent reports continue 
to call for other sensible safeguards, such as new regulation of the onshore oil and gas 





Continuing disasters, intense corporate bottom-line pressures, and threats to public 
safeguards, means that CSB’s work is as important as ever.   
 
CSB is moving forward to issue an incident reporting rule, produce guidance for corporate 
boards and executives in the offshore oil and gas industry, and to call for needed safety rules. 
 
In addition to these actions, please consider four additional proposals.  All four reforms would 
increase the authority of those with safety responsibilities. 
  
First, chemical engineers and other safety professionals need greater influence, as suggested by 
our investigation of the 2012 incident at Chevron in Richmond, California where the requests of 
company engineers to prevent corrosion were not heeded before a loss of containment led 12,000 
residents to seek medical evaluation.   HSE professionals should have clear lines of reporting to 
top executives and greater authority over safety decision making. 
 
Second, corporate Boards should have at least one member with professional expertise and 
experience and a clearly defined role to receive reports of incidents, near misses, and process 
safety risks and power to bring these issues to the attention of the entire board.  This was a CSB 
recommendation to BP after the 2005 Texas City refinery disaster which killed 15 contract 
workers. 
 
Third, according to a recent CSB Safety Digest, “worker participation is essential to improving 
process safety and preventing incidents at facilities with hazardous chemicals.”  These facilities 
should have, by law, a safety, health, and environment committee with equal representation by 
management and workers.  In union represented facilities, to comply with the National Labor 
Relations Act, unions must select the employee committee members. Committees should have 
authority to investigate hazards, incidents, and near misses, to help develop stop work authority 
programs and other policies, and to participate in all aspects of chemical safety.  There are clear 
precedents for worker engagement.  The 2017 California OSHA PSM standard covering oil 
refineries offers opportunities for worker participation in all aspects of the standard.  Sixteen 
state laws require safety committees.  Some labor-management contract agreements establish 
full-time worker safety and/or process safety representatives. 
   
And fourth, Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) deserve what they need to do their 
jobs to help prevent incidents, not only respond to them.  The Emergency Planning and 
Community Right to Know Act was enacted to help accomplish this – but Congress provided no 
funding or funding mechanism.  LEPCs should have a budget to hire experts, train their 
members, audit plants, and expand public engagement, including with workers and the low 




CSB’s investigation of the 2013 West, Texas ammonium nitrate disaster, which killed 12 
volunteer firefighters, underscores the urgency of providing our responders adequate resources.  
 
I hope the CSB will consider these four proposals in the future, whether as relevant 
recommendations stemming from incident investigations or through new safety studies of key 
issues. 
 
I encourage you to consider and debate these proposals, as well as your own ideas. 
 
Achieving any major changes will be hard.  It will take time.  But the alternative – more 
preventable disasters – is unacceptable. 
  
In closing, thank you again for your support of CSB. It’s made a huge difference.  And please… 
• Sign up to get the latest information at csb.gov 
• Read our investigation reports and watch our videos 
• Share them with colleagues, executives, and your workforce;  
And 
Be an engaged stakeholder – if you have a suggestion or see a need for CSB action – make sure 
CSB Board Members hear it. 
Finally, thank you for what you do every day to protect workers, our communities, and our 





























Total (2004-2013) 1,517 
Total (2005-2014) 1,448 
Total (2006-2015) 1,409 













         *May increase after the 2019 RMP reporting wave occurs. 
Source: Regulatory Impact Analysis Reconsideration of the 2017 Amendments to the Accidental 
Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, Section 
112(r)(7) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Office of Land and Emergency 
Management (OLEM) Office of Emergency Management (OEM), April 27, 2018, page 34 
(Exhibit 3-7). 
 
 
